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SOME PHASES OF MARRIAGE LAW AND
LEGISLATION FROM A SANITARY
AND EUGENIC STANDPOINT
No single institution known to modem law, not excepting that
of private property, is more important from a social and econ-
omic view-point, and none, probably, reflects more numerous
and complex elements, or exhibits more that is interesting in
its legal history, than does marriage. It is not the present pur-
pose, however, to discuss the history of marriage laws or
marriage as an institution further than is necessary to an under-
standing of the character and trend of modem law and legisla-
tion on the subject, and its scope, significance, and probable
efficacy from the view-point of public and individual health and
morals and the preservation and betterment of the race. It may
not be out of place to recall, however, that the Anglo-American
law of marriage has presented, practically throughout its history:
first, the common law element; second, the ecclesiastical element ;"
and third, the statutory element, Which last has, at least until
comparatively recent years, been largely dominated both in its
provisions and their interpretation by common law and ecclesias-
tical ideas; and to show, at least in a general way, that the accom-
plishments and possibilities of the first two elements in the
interest of so-called eugenics and sexual and general prophylaxis
have been by no means fully understood or exhausted, in view of
the adaptability of the principle of public policy and the doctrines
based upon the consensual character of marriage and the pre-
liminary engagement to marry.
It is doubtless a rule of the common law that courts can read
a principle of public policy nullifying a contract out of such
statutes as relate to things collateral but germane to its subject
matter. The Supreme Court of Oregon has accordingly held,
that in view of local statutes having for their purpose the preven-
' We have had no ecclesiastical courts in this country. Courts of equity
have quite generally assumed jurisdiction to declare marriages void for
such original defects as fraud, mistake and mental incapacity. (See I
Bish. Mar. Div. & Sep. Secs. 8o2 et seq.) And in England since the act
of 1857 this jurisdiction has been lodged in the secular courts, along with
matters of separation and divorce and their usual incidents. Secs. 2o and
2z Vict. c. 85 and the judicature Act of 1873.
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tion of the spread of pulmonary tuberculosis, a man is not liable
for breach of a marriage promise, even where he knew that the
woman had that disease when the engagement was entered into,
her ailment proving incurable. 2  And by the great weight of
authority in this country, if one promises in good faith to marry,
but afterwards discovers that he has a disease, not due to his
criminal or immoral conduct pending the engagement, unfitting
him for marriage, or rendering it dangerous to himself, or to the
offspring of the union, he may withdraw from the contract
without liability, or insist upon postponement of performance,
depending upon whether his ailment is curable or not; and so
if the plaintiff contracts such disease.-
While it is quite well settled that the positive misrepresentation
by the plaintiff of a material fact inducing it, will render the
preliminary contract or engagement of marriage voidable, mere
non-disclosure as to health, wealth, character, social position, hab-
its, or previous history, is quite generally held to be no justifi-
cation of non-performance. It would seem quite certain,
however, that the non-disclosure of disease of a character that
would be likely to render the marriage dangerous to the defend-
ant, or to taint the marriage offspring, or that would be reason-
ably certain to frustrate its happiness, would justify the defend-
ant's refusal to perform.
4
Most of our courts would have little difficulty in applying this
rule in cases of venereal disease and possibly to insanity and
'Grover v. Zook, 44 Wash. 489, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 582, 12o Am. St. R.
1012. See also Travis v. Schnebly, 68 Wash. i, 4o L. R. A. (N. S.) 585
and note.
'Gring v. Lerch, 112 Pa. 244, 56 Am. R. 314; Goddard v. Westcott, 82
Mich. 18o; Allen v. Baker, 86 N. Car. 91, 41 Am. R. 444; Schackelford v.
Hamilton, 93 Ky. 8o, 15 L. R. A. 531, 4o Am. St. R. 166; Trammel v.
Vaughn, 158 Mo. 214, 81 Am. St. R. 302, 51 L. R. A. 854, and cases cited.
Compare Smith v. Compton, 67 N. J. L. 548, 58 L. R. A. 48o. The case
of Hall v. Wright, El., BI., & El. 746, 96 E. C. L. 746, holding that a
defendant in a breach of promise suit could not justify a non-performance
of the contract by showing that marriage would be apt to endanger his
life by reason of the development of severe hemorrhage from the lungs,
has been the subject of almost universal criticism in this country. See,
however, Smith v. Compton, supra.
'Atchinson v. Baker, Peake Ad. Cas. lO3; Gring v. Lerch, 112 Pa. 245,
56 Am. R. 314; Comp. Baker v. Cartright, io C. B. (N. S.) 124, where
the prior insanity of the woman and her confinement in an asylum was
held no defense. See, Travis v. Schnebly, 68 Wash. I, 4o L. R. A. (N. S.)
585 and note.
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tuberculosis. In fact, in cases of the former, the rule might
often be invoked that a man is justified on the ground of fraud in
breaking his engagement with a woman previously unchaste,
where the fact was unknown to him when his promise was made,
provided, of course, he acts promptly upon discovering the fact.
5
Furthermore, no sufficient legal reason could probably be urged
why the concealment of insanity, epilepsy, or of a positive crimi-
nal history and tendencies should not, under a cautious applica-
tion of the foregoing principles, be given like effect without the
aid of statute.6
Alcoholism and drug addictions should likewise provide a
defense, at least where they arise or are discovered pending the
engagement, and this would be the only logical view where these,
as in many jurisdictions, are made grounds for either limited
or absolute divorce. It is hardly necessary to say that as the man
is rarely plaintiff in a breach of promise suit, and as the man and
not the woman is the one commonly afflicted with alcoholism or
venereal disease, but little benefit to the race and but trifling
increase of individual happiness can be expected from the appli-
cation of these principles to alcoholism and venereal disorders in
breach of promise suits.
Before leaving the subject of breach of the marriage promise,
another decision of the Washington court merits attention. This
is Tavis v. Schnebly.7 Here there was no pretense of fraud.
The woman became ill without fault of either party, pending the
engagement, and it was held that the mar was released there-
'from, subject to the qualification that where he had consented to
a postponement of performance because of her ill-health, he was
bound to wait a reasonable time for her recovery. Such a deci-
sion seems a hard one for the woman, but is it not as reasonable to
hold that a right-minded woman whose condition had become such
that she could not be a helpmate for the man, even if she could
bear him healthy children, should release him from his promise,
as to hold that he should submit to the ruin of his domestic
"Burnett v. Simpkins, 24 Il. 264; Snowman v. Wardell, 32 Me. 275;
Espey v. Jones, 37 Ala. 379; Bell v. Eaton, 28 Ind. 468, 92 Am. D. 329.
' See i Bish. Mar. Div. & Sep. 220, 221, criticising Baker v. Cartright,
supra. A collection of cases on ill-health as a defense in breach of promise
cases see the note to Grover v. Zook, in 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 582, and article
in 16 Harv. L. Rev. 226, recommending a classification of diseases for
purposes of defense.
'68 Wash. I, 40 L. R. A. (N. S.) 585.
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future or pay damages for his refusal to do so. That "a man does
not marry a woman for the pleasure of paying for her board
and washing," savors, of the brutally practical, but we should
remember the tendency of unhappy marriages to produce immo-
rality within the marriage tie, and ihat much that is cogent has
been urged by jurists and philosophers against permitting breach
of promise suits at all. Should it not be held therefore that
there is an implied condition in every contract to marry, that
any change in the physical or mental condition of the parties, or
either of them, that would practically frustrate the purposes of
the marriage, will warrant rescission? s
Perhaps considerable can also be expected from a progressive
and intelligent application of common law and equity principles
and precedents in matters of divorce or technical nullity. The
chief difficulty, of course, is that legal interference in such cases
usually comes too late to save the plaintiff from infection, or
children from hereditary taint, and that once marriage is entered
into, considerations of affection, pride, religion, and the dread of
scandal too often lead to passive acceptance of conditions justi-
fying legal relief, and the continuance of a relation that ought
never to have been formed. Still, a brief resum6 of the principles
of the unwritten law of this subject may be of some value.
At common law, the marriage of an idiot was absolutely void.
This was also the rule of the canon and the ecclesiastical laws,
which classed both idiocy and insanity proper, where the latter
impeded marriage, as diriment impediments, as distinguished-from
the purely canonical ones.9 Substantially as in contract generally,
the test of mental competency for marriage has been based by the
common law courts and the ecclesiastical and chancery courts,
upon the ability to comprehend the nature of the relation formed,
and, at least in a general way, its ordinary consequences.10 If
this test was fulfilled it apparently made no difference that one
or both parties were feeble-minded so long as no fraud was prac-
ticed, or that either or both parties were clearly insane from a
'See the dictum in Wanecek v. Kratny, 69 Neb. 77o, 66 L. R. A. 798.
"See i Bish. Mar. Div. & Sep., sec. 588 et seq.
" Portsmouth v. Portsmouth, i Hagg. Ecc. 355, 3 Eng. Ecc. 154; Durham
v. Durham, 1o P. D. So; Hunter v. Edny, IO P. D. 93; Orchardson v.
Colfield, 171 Ill. 14, 63 Am. St. R. 211, 4o L. R. A. 256; Lewis v. Lewis,
44 Minn. 124, 2o Am. St. R. 559, 9 L. R. A. 5o5; Kern v. Kern, 51 N. J.
Eq. 574; St. George v. Biddlefor, 76 Me. 593; Nonnemacher v. Nonne-
reacher, 159 Pa. 634; Ward v. Dulaney, 23 Miss. 414.
5
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medical standpoint, or that the insanity was of a nature likely to
taint the offspring. Neither party could attack the marriage on
the ground of the mental condition of either.
The only physical or psychological condition short of idiocy
or insanity that constituted an impediment to marriage, by the
English ecclesiastical law, was impotency. By that law, which
has furnished generally our interpretations of divorce and nullity
statutes and a basis to some extent for chancery relief, this con-
sisted in such practically incurable physical or psychological
defect or peculiarity as precluded normal sexual relations between
the parties. It was originally a purely canonical impediment
authorizing a decree of nullity in the ecclesiastical courts, and
it has been held in this country that chancery has no inherent
power to pronounce a decree of nullity for this cause without
the aid of statute, even where the defendant was guilty of fraudu-
lent concealment with respect to it."
Impotency, however, under ordinary circumstances, though an
almost universal ground for nullity or divorce, has but little
strictly eugenic significance, for it precludes the possibility of off-
spring. If, however, the existence of- venereal or other com-
municable or transmissible disease can be treated as impotency,
the reverse is of course true. The courts, however, have not
gone very far in so declaring it. True, at least one court has
apparently held that incurable syphilis constitutes impotency or
physical incapacity, within the meaning of the law, though its
concealment also constitutes a fraud,12 and most of the cases
on this subject involve concealment or misrepresentation as to
the disease, and are based more or less plainly upon the ground
of fraud alone.
1 3
11See Anon. 24 N. J. Eq. ig; Burtis v. Burtis, I Hopk. Ch. (N. Y.)
557, 14 Am. D. 563; Benton v. Benton, I Day (Conn.) 1II, 114; compare
Gould v. Gould, 78 Conn. 242, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 531.
' Ryder v. Ryder, 66 Vt. 158, 44 Am. St. R. 833.
"Ryder v. Ryder, supra; Hooe v. Hooe, 122 Ky. 590, 5 L. R. A. (N. S.)
729; Smiith v. Smith, 171 Mass. 4o4, 68 Am. St. R. 440, 41 L. R. A. 8oo;
Crane v. Crane, 62 N. J. Eq. 21; Stevenson v. Stevenson, 178 N. Y. 54;
C- v. C- , 158 Wis. 3O1. Compare Vondal v. Vondal, 175 Mass.
383, 78 Am. St. R. 5o, where a decree was refused, the disease (syphilis)
being in a non-contagious stage, and probably curable, though it might
be transmitted to offspring. There had been four months cohabitation,
and the decision'seems to have rested upon the ground of ratification or
condonation. But see on this last point Hooe v. Hooe, supra, and note
thereto in 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 729; C- v. C- , supra.
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Turning definitely to the subject of fraud, it may be said that
upon principles of public policy, the courts have generally been
very reluctant save in the strongest cases to pronounce a decree
of nullity of marriage on that ground, with or without the aid
of ordinary statutes, particularly after consummation and the
birth of issue. Generally the fraud must, unless perhaps in New
York, be in what are termed the essentalia of the marriage.
Precisely what is meant by this term, we are not yet clearly
informed. Certainly mere wealth, character or social position are
not of these. Neither, with the exception of venereal disease,
as above indicated, has concealment or misrepresentation touch-
ing health been generally deemed such a fraud as would warrant
a decree of nullity.
14
In New York, however, the principles of fraud have been
applied rather more liberally than elsewhere, and the marriage of
an habitual criminal was annulled where he had represented him-
self to be an honest and iridustrious man. There was no consum-
mation.1 5 In another case, the marriage was annulled where the
defendant, though known as a respectable person, was a thief and
professional gambler. There was consummation, but no issue.18
Down to very recent years, legal restrictions upon the power,
right or capacity to marry have seldom had any conscious eugenic
basis. True, ecclesiastical and legislative restrictions upon the
marriage of those nearly related in blood have frequently been
defended upon the ground that such unions tended to produce
weak and degenerate offspring, but their original basis has doubt-
less been largely scriptural or traditional or founded upon more
or less vague notions of general morality and social convenience.
Furthermore, such restrictions create a relative and not an abso-
lute impediment at most.1 Statutes against miscegenation found
IlEwing v. Wheatley, 2 Hagg Ecc. 175; Scott v. Seabrght, 12 P. D. 21;
Lewis v. Lewis, 44 Minn. 124, 9 L. R. A. 505, 2o Am. St. R. 559; Cum-
mington v. Belchertown, 149 Mass. 223, 4 L. R. A. i3i; Wier V. Still, 31
Iowa io7; Varney v. Varney, 52 Wis. 120, 126; Lyon v. Lyon, 230 Ill.
366, 12 Am. & Eng. Ann. Cas. 25 and note,
" Keys v. Keys, 6 Misc. 355.
i 8 King v. Brewer, 8 Misc. 587. See Di Lorenzo v. Di Lorenzo, 174 N. Y.
467, 63 L. R. A. 92, 95 Am. St. R. 6og, and statutes and decisions cited and
discussed, for the legal policy in New York.
I Recent legislation in Wisconsin and several other states where they
were previously permitted, making first cousin marriages illegal, are doubt-
less based mainly upon the eugenic idea. On the whole, this restriction is
probably wise, although it is undeniable that such close matings often tend
to perpetuate the desirable traits of a strong stock. See Bulletin No. 9,
Eugenics Record Office.
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in many of our states have also been defended on the ground
that they save both races from deterioration, physical and moral,
through both heredity and association. At any rate the con-
stitutionality of race restrictions upon marriage or sexual rela-
tions has seldom been seriously questioned, so long as no dis-
crimination was made between the races as to legal penalties or
consequences.'8
Turning definitely to the so-called eugenic marriage legisla-
tion of the last few years, it may be stated at the outset that
though marriage, generally speaking, is a matter of general or
common right, it is so firmly bound up with the very life of the
state and with its social, moral and economic welfare as to be
distinctively and preeminently within the police power. So long
as laws for its regulation can find reasonable justification as pub-
lic health measures in the interest of those now living or of pos-
terity, or as promotive of public order and morality and the
protection of individuals from fraud and injury, they will doubt-
less be upheld as a constitutional exercise of this power. The
scope of such legislation within those limits will therefore be
largely a question of public and legislative wisdom and policy,.
and not of constitutional law or the limitation of police power,
whether the basic idea of such legislation be the protection of
one spouse from bodily harm, or the protection of the public or
posterity through the prevention of diseased or degenerate off-
spring.19
Interesting in this connection, if for no other reason than that
it involved the constitutionality and construction of a most radical
type of legislation, is Peterson v. Widule.29 It involved Chap-
ter 738 of the Laws of Wisconsin for 1913, being §2339 m.
Statutes of Wis. for 1913. This law, which has since been
amended, appears to have been the most drastic in some respects
of the recent marriage acts making a medical examination pre-
requisite to the lawful celebration of marriage. Some comment
on this case seems desirable, therefore, though no critical review
of it can be attempted. It is interesting here to note, however,
that by the consensts of popular and legal opinion, in spite of
See Freund, Police Power, sec. 675 a. See Bulletin No. 9, Eugenics.
Record Office, and statutes of nearly two-thirds of our states.
' See Freund, Police Power, secs. 124, 679; Peterson v. Widule, 157
Wis. 641 (1914); Gould v. Gould, 78 Conn. 242, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 531
and note to the same case in 19 Harv. L. Rev. 298.
' Supra.
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the elaborate provisions for ceremonial marriage long existing in
that state, and in spite of the so-called Eugenic Marriage Law
involved in this case, informal marriage per verba de praesenti,
at least if followed by cohabitation, was valid as at common law
in Wisconsin and is valid under the less drastic act of 1915.21
The law of 1913 so far as material to the decision in Peterson
v. Widule was substantially as follows:
"i. All male persons making application for license to
marry shall . . .be examined as to the existence or non-
existence in such person of any venereal disease, and it
shall be unlawful for the county clerk of any county to
issue a license to marry to any person who fails to present
and file with such county clerk a certificate setting forth
that such person is free from acquired venereal diseases so
nearly as can be determined by physical examination and
by the application of the recognized clinical and labora-
tory tests of scientific search.
(Here follows the prescribed form of physicians' cer-
tificate which recites that the party is free from all vene-
real diseases.)
"2. Such examiners shall be physicians duly licensed to
practice in this state, shall be persons of good moral char-
acter and of scientific attainments and at least thirty years
of age. The fee for such examinations, to be paid by the
applicant for examination before the certificate shall be
granted, shall not exceed three dollars. The county
physician of any county shall make the examination, if
said applicant be indigent.
"3. Whenever there is a dispute or disagreement
regarding the findings of any medical examiner, labora-
tory tests shall be made in the state laboratory of hygiene
from material submitted by such examiner, and the find-
ings of the said laboratory shall be accepted as evidence
of the presence or absence in the person examined of
any venereal disease.
"4. (This subdivision provides for an appeal to and
hearing by the county court without a jury where the
certificate is alleged to be improperly withheld.)
"5. (This subdivison relates to residents leaving the
state to marry.)
' 1Becker v. Becker, 153 Wis. 226, and authorities cited and discussed.
As this case involved the validity of an alleged marriage contracted in
1898, the effect of the law of 1913 was not involved. It may be supposed,
however, that the latter law would be treated as directory rather than
mandatory, particularly in view of the fact that its severe penalties are
denounced against licensing officers, physicians and those disclosing facts
relating to the examination, and not against the marrying parties them-
selves.
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"6. and 7. (These subdivisons prescribed heavy penal-
ties to county clerks for issuing licenses without the phy-
sician's certificate, to physicians for issuing false cer-
tificates, and to persons disclosing information relative to
the examination.)"
In mandamus against the county clerk for refusal to issue a
marriage license without the medical certificate prescribed by the
act, its constitutionality was attacked upon several grounds. It
was upheld, however, by five out of a bench of seven, at the
expense, so many think, of its partial emasculation, a work which
the legislature has since confirmed. Ignoring some elementary
though fundamental propositions laid down by the court, it was
held that the direction of the law against males only did not,
in view of the prevalence of venereal disease among them, and
its comparative rarity among women seeking matrimony, render
it unreasonable and arbitrarily discriminatory, nor did it inter-
fere in any respect with religious liberty. It was further held
that the first subdivision of the act did not require freedom from
all venereal disease in accordance with the certificate prescribed
by the act, but freedom only from acquired as distinguished from
inherited disease; and that the phrase "clinical and laboratory
tests of scientific search" when construed with subdivision two
of the act, fixing the fee for such examination at three dollars, did
not require the Wasserman test for syphilis, which could not be
made without special equipment which only a small proportion
of physicians in the state possessed, and only for a fee far in
excess of that prescribed; but that the law must be construed to
require only such an examination as the ordinary physician could
be expected to make for the fee provided by law. That the law
could be upheld only by resort to a strained and unnatural con-
struction of the language employed seems obvious; that the court
was torn by contending emotions in upholding it seems equally
clear.
In concluding these remarks upon the Wisconsin Law, it may
be interesting to note that among the substituted bills presented
to the legislature of Wisconsin now in session, was one said to
have originated with a committee of the State Medical Associa-
tion, preserving many of the features of the law of 1913, but
including "active pulmonary tuberculosis" and "communicable
(instead of acquired) venereal disease"; applying the law to
both sexes; 'making the certificate of "a reputable licensed
physician" sufficient without regard to his age; increasing his
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fee to five dollars, and substituting "usual and ordinary tests
and methods of examination" for the phrase, "recognized chem-
ical and laboratory tests of scientific search." This bill, it can
readily be seen, was in some respects more sweeping and drastic
than the act of 1913, and more nearly eugenic in the proper sense
of the term. However, it failed of passage. That it well reflects
the thought and sentiment of the medical profession generally is
open to doubt. The average physician -knows only too well that
next to the instinct and craving for food, the instinct and crav-
ings of sex are the strongest that actuate the race, and that sweep-
ing and drastic reforms placing a practical ban upon marriage
for any considerable number of the people are quite certain to
increase sexual immorality even if the evils stop with the direct
and familiar concomitants of vice and loose sexual connections.
Speaking of tuberculosis, a leading authority on that subject
says:
"While it is perfectly simple to assert, from a theoretic
point of view, that the tuberculous should not be per-
mitted to marry, the situation is entirely different when
regarded from a practical standpoint. Many assume the
matrimonial obligations without entertaining the remotest
idea of their condition, while in others the first manifesta-
tions of a disease previously latent appear some months
after marriage, or immediately following parturition.
The sweeping prohibition of marriage for consumptives
as a class must be regarded as both impracticable and
unwarranted. A problem so delicate can never be fairly
adjusted by recourse to arbitrary legal enactments based
upon the medical principles of marriage selection and the
social aspect of procreation. More properly it is within
the province of the physician in his professional capacity
to exert such an influence as may be indicated in his own
judgment according to the individual circumstances."22
Beyond this it seems to be conceded that though true heredi-
tary tuberculosis unquestionably occurs, the number of cases is
practically negligible. So far as this disease is concerned, there-
fore, post-marital infection of the healthy spouse or post-natal
infection of the children is practically all that prohibition of
marriage by the tuberculous would directly accomplish, beyond
a possible diminution of the birth rate of children of lower vital-
ity than parental freedom from tubercular disease implies.
'See Bonney-Pulmonary Tuberculosis, and its Complications, pp.
595, 596.
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The Wisconsin Medical Association bill, as already stated,
failed of passage and the act of 1913 was amended by Chapter
525 of the Laws of 1915. This chapter confines the examination
and a certificate of freedom of the male from venereal disease
as prerequisites to license, fixes the examiner's fee at $2.oo, puts
recognized chemical and laboratory tests of scientific search
within the discretion of the examining physician, and provides
that microscopic tests for gonococci shall be made by the State
Laboratory of Hygiene and the Wasserman test for syphilis shall
be made by the Psychiatric Institute, free of charge. Any
licensed physician may act and the certificate is simply of a
thorough examination and the examiner's belief in freedom from
all venereal diseases. The penalties against physicians and county
clerks and persons making disclosure are much reduced. The
conviction of a physician for issuing a false certificate would
of course be extremely difficult under this law. Nullity is the
penalty of evasive marriage out of the state.2 3 So far as vene-
real disease is concerned the views of the medical men are
more radical than with respect to other disorders, and this act
will probably have their quite general support. But until we can
provide lock hospitals or other means of quarantine for vene-
real patients, many of them have little faith in this prohibitive
legislation as a direct means of diminishing the communication
and transmission of venereal disease. Medical men, however,
seem generally to concede to marriage legislation of this kind an
educational value, as calling attention to the prevalence of vene-
real and other transmissible diseases, and their grave and far
reaching consequences to individuals and the race. Beyond this,
however, they appear to deem it wholly experimental, and would
generally oppose its extension beyond venereal disease, and
possible tuberculosis, until it can be ascertained how effectively
it works out. The Wisconsin law makes no provision so far as
we know for reports by examining physicians of certificates of
health refused under the law, though physicians are required
by a preexisting statute to report venereal disease generally, with-
out in any way disclosing the identity of the patient. It seems
impossible at present, therefore, to ascertain, even partially, how
far Wisconsin legislation has really prevented the marriage of
the diseased.
Perhaps the strongest argument in favor of legislation of this
type is, that men who know or suspect that they have venereal
'Chapter 27o, Laws of 1915.
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disease will refrain from marriage until they are confident that
they can meet the statutory medical test; that young men may be
restrained from impure conduct when they know that its conse-
quence may mean forfeiture or suspension of the right to form
legitimate domestic ties, and that the public generally will be
impressed with the gravity of venereal disorders, and the impor-
tance of sound health in relation to marriage and propagation
from the very presence of such legislation upon the statute books.
That such laws will often be evaded is but feeble argument
against them. At the same time it would seem that the existence
of common law marriage side by side with such drastic legisla-
tion is not only direct invitation to its evasion but is ridiculous in
itself. There is, of course, no means of estimating the number
of common law marriages contracted in Wisconsin since the act
of 1913, but they are doubtless quite numerous, and their incon-
venient consequences will at some time very likely be felt. The
writer remembers having clipped a paid item from a Milwaukee
newspaper soon after the passage of that act, to the effect that
"competent attorneys" were prepared to draft binding contracts
for all who desired to marry on the basis of the common law.
Many intelligent people both within and without the learned
professions may be pardoned for believing for reasons already
stated, for the reasons, or some of them, urged in Peterson v.
Widule, particularly in the concurring opinion of Justice Timlin
and the dissenting opinion of Justice Marshall, and for other
reasons still, including our present want of scientific knowledge
of much that concerns human life, particularly as applied to sex
relations and propagation, that legislation of the character just
considered is untimely and unwise, and that education rather than
legislation must be chiefly looked to for the renovation and sav-
ing of the race through wiser choice and greater self denial in
marriage. Those who maintain these views do not necessarily
hold a brief against sterilization of the feeble-minded, certain
classes of the insane, and the manifestly criminal and degenerate,
under proper restrictions. Indeed many of them do not fail to
recognize that among these, particularly the feeble-minded, the
tendency toward extra matrimonial propagation is greater than
among normals, owing, among other things, to their want of sex
control. Segregation, asexualization and sterilization, rather than
prohibition of marriage, are the only effective safeguards to
society, so far as such persons are concerned.
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Finally it should be noted that Wisconsin has not been the
pioneer or alone in legislation prohibiting the marriage of the
unfit. Michigan has long had a law prohibiting the marriage of
insane persons, idiots, or persons afflicted .with syphilis or gonor-
rhea. This act probably adds little or nothing to the prior law
so far as idiocy or insanity are concerned., No medical exami-
nation is provided for, but severe penalties are directed against
persons marrying who are afflicted with venereal disease, and
husband and wife are made competent witnesses for the state.
The absence of a medical examination and certificate doubtless
rendered this act of little practical value.24
The Connecticut statute (Chap. 325, Pub. Acts 1895) provides
that no man or woman, either of whom is epileptic, imbecile or
feeble-minded shall intermarry or live together as husband or
wife when the woman is under forty-five years of age. Any
person violating or attempting to violate any of the provisions
of this section shall be imprisoned in the state prison not less than
three years. This statute was held constitutional, though it was
held in the same case that the marriage of an epileptic in defi-
ance of it was voidable on the ground of fraud in concealing
the fact from the plaintiff, but not void.
25
In Indiana no license to marry shall be issued where either
of the parties is an imbecile, epileptic or of unsound mind, or
under guardianship as a *person of unsound mind, nor to any
male who has been within five years an inmate of any county
asylum or home for indigent persons, unless it satisfactorily
appears that the cause of such condition has been removed and
that such male applicant is able to support a family and is likely
to so continue, nor shall any license issue when either of the con-
tracting parties is afflicted with a transmissible disease, or at the
time of making application is under the influence of an intoxicat-
ing liquor or narcotic drug.
"Pub. Acts of Mich. for 1899, p. 387. The law has been strengthened
somewhat by the act of 19o5 which requires a physician's certificate of cure
and improbability of transmission of disease or defects before any person
who has been confined in a public institution as insane, epileptic, feeble
minded or imbecile, shall be licensed to marry. The act does not reach
patients in private institutions or in their houses.
' Gould v. Gould, 78 Conn. 242, 2 L. R. A. (N. S.) 53i. For statutes
of somewhat similar import, see Chap. 234, Laws of Minn. igoi; Kans.
Laws of 19o3, ch. 22o. See also statutes in Delaware, District of Columbia,
Maine, New Jersey, Ohio, Rhode Island.
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Provision is made for the immediate certification of the matter
to the circuit court in case license is refused, and an immediate
hearing without affirmative action by the applicant.
Nullity is the penalty for an evasive marriage out of the state.
The penalty for a false statement procuring license is a fine not
to exceed five hundred dollars. 26
The Oregon act requires a physician's certificate that the male
person is free from contagious or infectious venereal disease
before license shall issue. Perjury by the physician is punished
by revocation of his license. The fee is two dollars and a half,
but those who are without the price, but are nevertheless enthu-
siastic about marriage, may apply to the county physician. Noth-
ing is said about the character of the medical examination.
27
In Utah marriages are prohibited and declared void when con-
tracted with an idiot, lunatic or person afflicted with syphilis or
gonorrhea, that is uncured, or with a person afflicted with chronic
epileptic fits, provided the last qualification shall not apply to a
female over the age of forty-five years.2 8
The Washington statute is perhaps as sweeping as any on the
subject. It provides that no woman under the age of forty-five
years and man of any age, except he shall marry a woman over
forty-five years, either of whom is a common drunkard, habitual
criminal, epileptic, imbecile, feeble-minded person, idiot or insane
person, or person who has theretofore been afflicted with heredi-
tary insanity, or is afflicted with pulmonary tuberculosis in its
advanced stages, or any contagious venereal disease, shall there-
after intermarry or marry any other person within this state.
As to all but venereal disease, the woman as well as the man
must present a physician's sworn certificate of freedom from the
diseases or defects enumerated. The man only must show free-
dom from contagious venereal disease.
The penalties for wilful violation of the law are severe.2 9
The Minnesota Marriage Act authorizes the solemnization of
marriage by the Superintendent of the Department of the Deaf
Chap. 126, Laws of Ind. i9o5. A very similar law is found in Penn-
sylvania Laws of 1913, Chap. 458.
'Chap. 187, Laws of 1913.
'Laws of i9og, chap. log.
'Chap. 174, Laws of igog. See also chap. 2o7, Laws of N. Dak. 1913;
and see statutes of Oklahoma. Chapter 198, Laws of Vermont for 1915,
makes it a misdemeanor for persons afflicted with venereal disease to
marry. The penalties for violation of the law are quite heavy.
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and Dumb in the State Deaf, Dumb and Blind Institute. A
similar law is found in Ohio. Why legislatures should deem
it necessary or expedient to facilitate the marriage in these insti-
tutions it is difficult to imagine, in view of the fact that congenital
deaf-mutism, at least where both parties are defective, is very
apt to be perpetuated in the offspring.30 We know of no state
where such marriages are prohibited.
Some changes may have been made at recent sessions of the
legislatures in some of the statutes above cited or commented
upon, but nearly all of them still stand as indicated.31
In examining the statutes we find frequent prohibition in gen-
eral terms of marriage with idiots, imbeciles, persons of unsound
mind, lunatics, or insane persons. How much, if anything, these
statutes add to the unwritten law of the subject is open to doubt.
If they are to be construed to apply to all insane persons, luna-
tics, or persons of unsound mind, including those who have
capacity for assent as well as to those who have not, their wis-
dom may well be questioned. If they add nothing to the com-
mon law they are innocuous save that so long as they remain
unconstrued, they leave an important matter in doubt. It is only
in a few states that laws directed toward the insane and epileptic
take account of kinds or degrees, or make any attempt at defini-
tion or classification. Only two states forbid under any condi-
tion the marriage of those who have been insane.32 Though a
patient may have recovered from an insanity or other psychosis,
his or her marriage may be highly dangerous from an eugenic
standpoint, while one suffering from traumatic insanity may run
little or no risk of transmitting the affliction to offspring. Legis-
lation against marriage of the insane as it at present exists is
probably productive of very little good, not only because the
legislation itself is grossly defective, but because most insanities
have their onset after marriage and the birth of issue.
After all has been said, the fact remains that all laws restric-
tive of marriage on account of physical or mental diseases or
defects will be practically dead letters unless they effectively
provide for a proper medical examination as a prerequisite to
license or celebration. The fact also remains, that perhaps vene-
real disease aside, laws of the latter sort will be unpopular for
'See Special Reports on the Blind and Deaf, Census Bureau igoo.
' For American legislation down to June, 1913, see Bulletin No. 9 of
the Eugenics Record Office.
' See the statutes in Michigan and Washington already quoted.
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some time to come. Furthermore, as a recent writer says, "no
cheap device of a law against marriage will take the place of
compulsory segregation of gross defectives." They should be
eliminated from the eugenic problem by segregation during the
reproductive period, or by sterilization as a last resort.
Finally, marriage, which implies the home and the home and
family ties, is not merely the conservator of sex morality, and
by that means a quasi guardian of the public health, but it is the
greatest incentive to most that is best in human endeavor and
the soul and center of all that is finest and sweetest in human
life. In and of itself it tends to strengthen rather than to weaken
those traits and characteristics of the individual which make for
health and usefulness through happiness and right living. Leg-
islation we must indeed have for its regulation, but let that legis-
lation be based conservatively upon the firm ground of
ascertained facts and not upon the opinions of the ignorant fad-
dist, or the rash conclusions of the pseudo reformer to whom
legislation is always the proper poultice for every social sore.
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